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Reviewing Intergovernmental Institutions in Federal Systems: Opportunity for
Cooperation
HARRISON SCHAFER*
INTRODUCTION
This Article surveys intergovernmental institutions across federal states. Generally, these
institutions offer meaningful cooperation for the different levels of government when addressing
state problems. These institutions, however, often lack political authority to bind institutional
members or implement authoritative state actions.
This Article proceeds in two general parts. First, this Article taxonomizes
intergovernmental institutions across federal systems. Though few intergovernmental institutions
are constitutionally mandated bodies, several federal states have enacted legislation to formalize
these institutions while others simply utilize informal arrangements. This taxonomy will primarily
discuss contemporary institutions within federal systems and focus exclusively on executive
institutions.1 The taxonomy categorizes these institutions into two general categories based on the
composition of the bodies: vertical and horizontal. Vertical institutions include members that are
accountable to different levels of government while horizontal institutions are comprised of
members responsible to the same level of government. Intergovernmental institutions will also be
classified as either constitutional bodies, statutory bodies, or the result of formal and informal
agreements. Second, this Article offers brief remarks on the effectiveness, transparency, and power
of these institutions. Intergovernmental institutions wield nominal political authority, but
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1
Of course, intergovernmental institutions may also be legislative and institutional. For example, national
legislatures in federal states often include a house that incorporates members from constituent members. This
Article, however, does not address national legislatures. Nor does the Article address judiciaries that are responsible
to different levels of governments or bodies that facilitate intergovernmental relations by mediating interstate
disputes.
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intergovernmental institutions may nevertheless play an important role in federal states. Though
these institutions offer benefits related to intergovernmental relations, intergovernmental
institutions suffer from accountability, transparency, and logistical drawbacks.
I.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS & OPERATIONALIZATION

Federal states were traditionally conceived as layered states where different levels of
government wield distinct and identifiable “domains of power and responsibility.”2 Increasingly,
however, the different realms of autonomy and authority are shared across these levels. 3 Thus,
federal states may be politically divided among the federal or national level, a regional level, such
as states in the United States or cantons in Switzerland, and oftentimes at a municipal or local
level.4 These divisions of political power within federal states have often reflected a necessary
dispersion to compensate for a diverse and large democracy—multiple levels of government can
encourage democratic participation, legitimacy, and efficiency.5 Importantly, federal states
distribute state power, such as legislative competencies, among these different levels of
government pursuant to constitutional provisions.6
To maintain political control over the dispersed state and preserve the state as a whole,
federal states must maintain intergovernmental relationships. Distribution of state power across
different levels of government tends to benefit from coordination among the different levels of
government to effectively manage state problems. Intergovernmental relations, therefore, relates

Brian R. Opeskin, Mechanisms for Intergovernmental Relations in Federation, 52 INT’L SCIENCE J. 129, 129
(2001) (describing “dual federalism”).
3
Id.
4
See INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN FEDERAL SYSTEMS, BUSINESS COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA 1, 1 (2006),
https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/bca/pages/2638/attachments/original/1531460858/appendix1_intergovernmental-relations-in-federal-systems_28-10-2006.pdf?1531460858.
5
See Cheryl Saunders, The Interdependence of Federalism and Democracy in Australia, in FEDERALISM AS
DECISION-MAKING CHANGES IN STRUCTURES, PROCEDURES AND POLICIES 27–31 (Francesco Palermo & Elisabeth
Alber, eds., 2015).
6
Id.
2
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to the mechanisms and processes that states develop to facilitate cooperative action across the
different levels of government, though these institutions may also aid interstate action as well.7
Intergovernmental institutions may be defined as the institutional bodies that operationalize
intergovernmental relations in federal states.
For this Article, intergovernmental institutions are the formal or informal bodies that either
incorporate actors across the different levels of government or that incorporate several
governmental actors from the same level of government, e.g. Länder in Austria. Consequently,
this definition includes a variety of bodies that wield different levels of legal status. These
institutions may be constitutionally mandated bodies, statutorily created bodies, and bodies that
lack formal legal status. Intergovernmental institutions are as diverse as the federal states that
implement them, and these institutions respond to distinct political, historical, social, and
geographical factors within states.8
This Article will categorize intergovernmental institutions into two broad categories—
vertical and horizontal—and then further delineate smaller pools of institutions based on the
primary purpose of the institution or based upon the institution’s constituent members. Significant
or noteworthy institutions within these subcategories will then be examined in detail. The
discussion within the subcategories will examine membership, functions of the body, efficacy, and
status of the institution. Though lacking generalizable characteristics, policy-focused institutions
will be briefly discussed. Lastly, the Article offers reflections on intergovernmental institutions
and areas deserving further research.

7

See Business Council, supra note 1, at 4; Opeskin, supra note 2, at 129.
See Johanne Poirier & Cheryl Saunders, Cooperative Mechanisms and Intergovernmental Relations in Federal
Regimes, in DIALOGUES ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN FEDERAL SYSTEMS 3 (Rupak Chattopadhyay &
Karl Nerenberg, eds., 2010).
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II.

TAXONOMY

Overwhelmingly, federal states employ executive institutions more than any other type of
intergovernmental body. Executive institutions, interestingly, are especially prominent in states
with Westminster systems due to the executive dominance of parliament. Because of their
popularity, executive intergovernmental institutions vary greatly in their legal status across federal
states.
A. Vertical Institutions
Vertical institutions are composed of members who, either directly or indirectly, represent
different levels of government within a federal state. This relationship may be between two levels
of government, e.g. between the national and state level, or among all constituent members of a
state, which may include territories, local governments, and autonomous communities.
1. Chief Minister Conferences
Across all federal states, the most popular executive institution for intergovernmental
relations is the chief minister conference.9 The name of this executive institution describes the
primary composition of the bodies. Chief minister conferences normally consist of the chief
executives of each significant level of government,10 though some states also incorporate heads of
local government.11 For example, the Council of Australian Governments includes not only the
federal prime minister and the heads of states and territories, but also the president of the Australian
Local Government Association,12 an organization representing over 500 municipal councils across

9

Poirier & Saunders, at 5.
See, e.g., John Phillimore & Jeffrey Harwood, Intergovernmental Relations in Australia: Increasing Engagement
Within a Centralizing Dynamic, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN FEDERAL SYSTEMS 53–54 (Poirier et al.,
eds., 2015) (describing the Council of Australian Governments); M.P. Singh & Rekha Saxena, Intergovernmental
Relations in India: From Centralization to Decentralization, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN FEDERAL
SYSTEMS 252–53 (Poirier et al., eds., 2015) (describing the Interstate Council of India).
11
See, e.g., Phillimore & Harwood, supra note 10, at 54.
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Id.
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Australia.13 Similarly, South Africa’s chief minister conference also incorporates a representative
for organized local governments.14 The federal level of government, however, often enjoys the
greatest representation on these bodies as union ministers frequently join chief minister
conferences15 or because the chief federal minister wields the authority to appoint additional
members to the body.16
States have employed a variety of methods to implement chief minister conferences. Some
states, like Australia17 and Canada,18 have created chief minister conferences simply through
formal and informal agreements. Such institutions have sprung forth from a concentrated need for
coordination across different levels of government in response to internal problems, e.g. barriers
to trade or differences in tax policies. Other states, such as India19 and Nigeria,20 have
constitutional provisions that mandate the creation of chief minister conferences. States have also
enacted legislation to implement chief minister conferences. Notably, South Africa’s
Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act provides a useful example of comprehensive
legislation designed to implement institutions to promote intergovernmental relations.21 Unlike the
constitutional provisions, South Africa’s legislation provides a comprehensive legal foundation
and guidance for the role and operation of its chief minister conference.

13

About ALGA, AUSTRALIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT ASSOCIATION, https://alga.asn.au/about-alga/ (last visited Oct.
24, 2019).
14
Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act 13 of 2005 § 6 (S. Afr.).
15
See Singh & Saxena, supra note 10, at 253 (noting that key union ministers also serve on the Interstate Council).
16
Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act 13 of 2005, GN 482 of GG 27898 Part 1 § 6 (15 Aug. 2005) (S.
Afr.).
17
See Phillimore & Harwood, supra note 10, at 53
18
See NICOLA MCEWEN, BETTINA PETERSOHN & COREE BROWN SWAN, R INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS &
PARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY: A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW 32 (2015),
https://www.parliament.scot/2015.09.30_IGR_External_Research_Report_FINAL.pdf.
19
INDIA CONST. art 263.
20
Constitution of Nigeria (1999), cap.8.
21
See Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act 825 of 2005 (S. Afr.).
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Despite the variety in legal statuses of chief minister conferences, these institutions
overwhelmingly lack actual legal authority that binds constituent members. For example, India’s
Interstate Council largely serves as a forum for debate and rarely generates subsequent action by
its members.22 Instead, the conferences normally produce reports, recommendations, and guidance
to other state institutions such as parliament and executive heads of government. Normally, the
federal chief minister convenes meetings, chairs the meetings, and often sets the agenda for
conference meetings.23
These conferences still serve important intergovernmental roles despite the institution’s
lack of traditional state power. Specifically, conferences—such as Spain’s Conference of
Presidents or Australia’s Council of Australian Governments—are important forums for
encouraging political unity and providing informal avenues for intergovernmental negotiations on
important state issues.24 Despite frequent lack of authority, these institutions can guide national
and local policies and coordinate intergovernmental actions against internal challenges.25
1. Ministerial Intergovernmental Bodies
The name of this category represents the primary composition and role of these institutions.
These bodies are normally comprised of the federal minister for a specific department or cabinet,
such as education or finance, the corresponding state level minister, and a litany of other ministers
across different levels of government.26 Ministerial bodies, like the chief minister conferences,

22

Singh & Saxena, supra note 10, 253.
See, e.g., id. at 252 (noting that the Indian Prime Minister chairs and convenes Interstate Council meetings).
24
See McEwen et al., supra note 18, at 46; Martin Painter, The Council of Australian Governments and
Intergovernmental Relations: A Case of Cooperative Federalism, 26 PUBLIUS 103, 103–107 (1996).
25
See e.g., Derek Powell, Constructing a Developmental State in South Africa: The Corporation of
Intergovernmental Relations, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN FEDERAL SYSTEMS 325 (Poirier et al., eds.,
2015) (mentioning that the President’s Coordinating Council helped plan and prepare the 2010 FIFA World Cup).
26
See e.g., Robert Agranaoff & Juan Antonio Ramos Gallarin, Toward Federal Democracy in Spain: An
Examination of Intergovernmental Relations, in 27 PUBLIUS 1, 6–7 (1997) (describing the Consejode Politico Fiscal
y Financieradelas Comunida des Autonomas, an institution composed of finance ministers from Spain’s autonomous
committees, the federal minister of finance).
23
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may also incorporate representatives from local governments. For example, Australia’s ministerial
councils may incorporate representatives from municipal councils if the council’s work will impact
local governments.27 Since the federal government typically has many ministers and respective
portfolios, several ministerial bodies will often be operating within federal states.28 These
institutions are normal intergovernmental bodies and are implemented in Spain, Nigeria,
Argentina, South Africa, Canada, Belgium, Switzerland, and Austria.29
Ministerial bodies are mostly the product of arrangements lacking legal authority,30 but
some surveyed systems have implemented ministerial bodies through formal legal action such as
legislation31 or executive order. For example, South Africa’s IGR Act represents an impressive
implementation and foundation of intergovernmental institutions with its “national
intergovernmental forums.”32 This legislation allows any cabinet member to establish a ministerial
body to “promote and facilitate intergovernmental relations in the functional area” for which the
minster holds the portfolio.33 Within a state, however, all ministerial bodies may not share the
same legal status. For instance, several ministerial bodies within Canada are the result of

27

COMMONWEALTH-STATE RELATIONS BRANCH DEPARTMENT OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND CABINET, GUIDANCE
ON COAG COUNCILS, § 2.5 (Aug. 2016), https://www.coag.gov.au/sites/default/files/files/guidance-on-coagcouncils.docx.
28
Phillimore & Harwood, supra note 10, at 55 (noting that Australia has utilized anywhere from forty to eighty
different bodies).
29
Andreas Ladner, Switzerland: Subsidiarity, Power-Sharing, and Direct Democracy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF LOCAL AND REGIONAL DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE 213–14 (Frank Hendriks et al., eds., 2011).
30
See Marc-Antoine Adam et al., Intergovernmental Relations in Canada, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN
FEDERAL SYSTEMS 146–48 (Poirier et al., eds., 2015).
31
E.g., Maria Jesus Garcia Morales & Xavier Arbos Marin, Intergovernmental Relations in Spain: An Essential but
Underestimated Element of the State of Autonomies, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN FEDERAL SYSTEMS 360
(Johanne Poirier et al., eds., 2015) (noting that Spain’s “sectoral conferences” are governed by federal legislation).
32
Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act 13 of 2005, GN 482 of GG 27898, Chapter 2, Part 2 (15 Aug. 2005)
(S. Afr.).
33
Id.
7

memorandums of understanding that are essentially dictated by the federal members,34 while other
institutions may be grounded in binding agreements.35
Like the chief minister conferences, the majority of ministerial bodies provide nonbinding
action and support intergovernmental efforts across the state. Overwhelmingly, these bodies serve
as coordinating institutions for ministers—the ministers will often discuss implementing policies
in their respective spheres of government. Ministerial bodies normally provide a platform for state
ministers to voice thoughts on national policy.36
B. Horizontal Institutions
Horizontal institutions are comprised of members across a single order of government, e.g.
several representatives from local governments. Consequently, these institutions are utilized by
the lower orders of government within a federal state.
1. Regional Conferences
Unlike vertical intergovernmental institutions, regional conferences do not formally
incorporate federal representatives into the institutions’ composition. These conferences, however,
may informally seek dialogue with members of the federal government. These institutions serve a
significant role in advocating for state-level power and coordination for unified state action when
interacting with union level actors—meetings among the state representatives provide a valuable
forum for harmonizing policies before negotiating with the federal level of government.
Membership is naturally limited to the member states within the federal state or a group of
municipalities throughout the state.

34

See About Us, COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF EDUCATION, CANADA, https://www.cmec.ca/11/About_Us.html (last
visited Sept. 22, 2019) (noting that the CMEC is governed by an “Agreed Memorandum”).
35
See Agreement on Internal Trade, Fourteenth Protocol of Amendment, Consolidated Version, part V chap. 16, art.
1601 (2015) (Can.) repealed by Canadian Free Trade Agreement, part V, ch. 11, art. 1101 (2017).
36
See e.g., Powell, supra note 25, at 327.
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Regional conferences, like chief minister bodies, enjoy a range of implementation
mechanisms. These institutions, however, are primarily the result of formal and informal
agreements among states in an effort to improve states’ position in relation to the federal level of
government.37 For instance, Canada’s Council of the Federation was formally recognized in an
intergovernmental agreement after years of informal operation.38 Research seems to suggest that
state conferences are more often supported by legislation than municipal conferences.
Though most regional conferences are simply informal bodies, these institutions
sometimes bind members. Because state conferences operate to coordinate states’ positions on
issues when interacting with federal or extraterritorial actors, conference actions routinely formally
or informally bind members. State conference action, however, is often developing joint positions
on policy issues, potentially to alleviate concerns of seceding authority to a nongovernmental
institution.39 In their day-to-day operations, state conferences embody a spirit of power-sharing.
For example, within both Germany and Austria’s state conferences, chairs of the Conferences
rotate annually among the states, and the locations for meetings track the current chair.40
Municipal conferences are similarly structured and oriented. Membership may be
voluntary, like Australia’s Local Government Association or Switzerland’s Städteverband, which
allows Swiss communities with more than 5,000 inhabitants to apply.41 Alternatively, membership
may be automatic, such as in South Africa’s District Intergovernmental Forums, which include all

37

See e.g., Roland Lhotta & Julia von Blumethal, Intergovernmental Relations in the Federal Republic of Germany:
Complex Co-operation & Party Politics, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN FEDERAL SYSTEMS 218 (Poirier et
al., eds., 2015).
38
McEwan et al., supra note 18, at 34.
39
Yvonne Hegele & Nathalie Behnke, Horizontal Coordination in Cooperative Federalism: The Purpose of
Ministerial Conferences in Germany, 27 REGIONAL & FED. STUD 1, 22–23 (2017).
40
Lhotta & von Blumethal, supra note 37, at 219; Ferdinand Karlhofer & Günther Pallaver, Strength Through
Weakness: State Executive Power and Federal Reform in Austria, 19 SWISS POL. SCI. REV. 41, 48–49 (2013).
41
See Statuten Schweizerischer Städteverband, SCHWEIZERISCHEN STÄDTEVERBAND (Aug. 21, 2017),
http://www.corstat.ch/de/regionalstatistik/schweiz-staedteverband/statuten/.
9

mayors of local municipalities and the executive mayor of the district.42 Apart from Switzerland’s
model, municipal conferences mirror state conferences in their egalitarian operation. Normally, all
members have at least limited power over setting items on meeting agendas and can call for
conference meetings.43 Municipal conferences are overwhelmingly designed to facilitate
coordinated action on common problems facing municipalities. In furtherance of this role,
municipal conferences normally discuss problems or national legislation that will affect
municipalities.44
The voluntary model for municipal conferences, exemplified by Switzerland and
Australia’s conferences, present a formalized, bureaucratic and academic operation. Rather than
using preexisting governmental structures to determine membership, local government
associations, like those in Australia and South Africa, include local government organizations from
different states, e.g. the Local Government Association of Queensland is a member of the
Australian Local Government Association.45 Local government associations then elect executive
officers who will serve as representatives in vertical intergovernmental institutions.46 The Swiss
model, perhaps the oldest intergovernmental institution surveyed in this Article, is an abnormally
situated municipal conference due to its somewhat complex composition and its unique
authority—the Städteverband’s political action is sanctioned under Article 50 of the Swiss
Constitution and allows for regular consultation with the federal government.47 The organization

42

Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act 13 of 2005, GN 482 of GG 27898, Chapter 4 § 25 (S. Afr.). Note
that despite that this institution technically includes a vertical division of government—district and municipal—this
Article treats the DGIFs nevertheless as horizontal because the forum is designed for local governments generally.
43
See e.g., id.
44
See L. Malan, Intergovernmental Relations and Co-operative Government in South Africa: The Ten-Year Review,
24 POLITEIA 226, 235 (2005).
45
About ALGA, AUSTRALIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT ASSOCIATION, https://alga.asn.au/about-alga/ (last visited Oct.
24, 2019).
46
Id.
47
The Städteverband was founded around 1897. See Städteverband, SCHWEIZERISCHEN STÄDTEVERBAND,
https://staedteverband.ch/de/Info/stadteverband (last visited Nov. 14, 2019).
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incorporates three levels of membership—voting representatives, nonvoting representatives, and
patron members.48 Further, the Städteverband consists of three core organs that wield different
authority and perform separate roles (the assembly of delegates, the governing board, and the
inspecting body) and three ancillary bodies (federal politics working group, the standing
commission, and an administrative body).49 Like local government associations, Switzerland’s
municipal conference also serves as a consultative forum for municipalities, but the Städteverband
also sponsors and provides services, training courses, conferences, studies, and exhibitions on
subjects relating to municipal governance.50
C. Policy-Specific Institutions
Policy-specific institutions are designed to address specific policy areas or state problems.
Unlike the ministerial bodies or chief minister conferences, memberships for policy-specific
institutions are often more diverse and varied. Thus, the main difference between these institutions
and ministerial bodies lies in membership composition. These institutions do not follow a
generalizable formula similar to other intergovernmental institutions discussed within this Article.
Overall, these institutions wield wildly varying degrees of political and legal power, though few
actually bind governmental members. Overwhelmingly, these institutions are the creation of
federal legislation. These institutions may not fall within the normal vertical-horizontal dichotomy.
Rather, certain institutions are specifically designed to operate apart from governmental influence
but still function to facilitate intergovernmental relations. Though falling outside of the traditional
taxonomy this Article formulates, these institutions are nevertheless noteworthy and present
interesting approaches to comprehensive interstate action.

48

Id.
Id.
50
Id. art. II.
49
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1. Financial Institutions
These institutions are generally aimed at tax harmonization and the distribution of revenue
across the different levels of government. These bodies are primarily advisory, but there some
examples of financial institutions that wield binding powers.51 Membership for financial
institutions vary, and some may not inherently appear to be intergovernmental based purely on
membership. For instance, Australia’s Commonwealth Grants Commission partly forbids any
individual who is employed by federal or state government from serving on the Commission.52
Despite the members potentially lacking direct responsibility to state or federal governments,
commissioners still serve an intergovernmental role by acting as an intermediary for the states and
the federal government. Upon application from a state for a specific federal grants, the
Commission must inquire and report to the Minister of the Treasury advice on the fiscal impact of
the grant.53 The Commission provides feedback and recommendations to the federal government
on matters related to state financial assistance and aims to achieve horizontal fiscal equalization.54
On the other hand, South Africa’s Financial and Fiscal Commission of South Africa utilizes
a more direct intergovernmental approach to membership. The Commission consists of three
individuals selected from a list compiled by the Premiers, two individuals selected from a list
compiled by local governments, a chairperson, a deputy chairperson, and two additional
individuals who all serve no more than five years per term.55 These bodies are primarily the
creation of federal legislation. Further, financial institutions primarily serve as advisory bodies for

51

See, e.g., Commonwealth Grants Commission Act of 1976 (Austl.); Neil Warren, Reform of the Commonwealth
Grants Commission: It’s All in the Detail, 31 U. NEW SOUTH WALES L.J. 530, 530 (2008).
52
Commonwealth Grants Commission Act, supra note 51, § 8.
53
See id. § 16(1).
54
Warren, supra note 51, at 530.
55
Financial and Fiscal Commission Act 99 of 1997 § 5 (S. Afr.).
12

the federal government. By advising the federal government, the financial institutions help provide
better fiscal management and application for state level governments.
2. Infrastructural Institutions
There are few examples of Infrastructural Institutions—these bodies serve niche roles and
often require preexisting, developed governmental institutions to support them. Infrastructural
Institutions mostly provide advice on harmonizing building codes and construction safety
recommendations. Like financial institutions, Infrastructural Institutions may utilize technocratic
or governmental actors as members. For instance, the Austrian Institute of Construction
Engineering includes delegates from the federal states themselves that may not be members of
government.56 Conversely, South Africa’s Infrastructure Coordinating Council consists of the
federal president, the deputy president, any minister chosen by the president (primarily ministers
holding a portfolio related to infrastructure), each premier representing the nine provinces,
executive mayors of metropolitan councils, and the chairperson of the South African Local
Government Association.57 The Coordinating Council directly monitors and directs major
development projects that are deemed “strategic integrated projects.”58 Council chairpersons of
the Provincial Infrastructure Coordinating Council coordinate executive governmental actors that
are impacted by the projects to implement necessary governmental action, which may include
public condemnation in furtherance of the project.59

56

About Us, AUSTRIAN INSTITUTE OF CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING, https://www.oib.or.at/en/about-us (last visited
Nov. 14, 2019).
57
Infrastructure Development Act 23 of 2014 § 3 (S. Afr.).
58
Id. part 4.
59
Powell, supra note 25, at 328.
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1. Public Health Institutions
Intergovernmental public health institutions serve a crucial role in coordinating the power
of the state to address vital public health services and problems such as disease prevention and
healthcare management. These, like other policy institutions, provide a body to promote
harmonization and unified intergovernmental action. Such is the case with Brazil’s Tripartite
Committee for Health. Created by ministerial decree amid the state’s decentralization efforts and
push towards healthy policy integration, the Committee aims to achieve agreements regarding the
nationwide operation of the Unified Health System, Brazil’s nationalized healthcare system.60 The
Committee generally operates as a forum where representatives from each level of government
discuss, negotiate, and reach decisions on the decentralization of Brazil’s health policy.61
The Committee is composed of representatives from all three levels of government: five
representatives of the federal Ministry of Health, five representatives from the National Council
of State Health Secretaries, and five representatives from the National Council of Municipal Health
Secretaries.62 Each level of government appoints their respective representatives to the Committee.
Though there are formal rules pertaining to setting items on the agenda for Committee meetings,
the forum is often dominated by the federal Ministry of Health.63 These regulations normally
implement mechanisms for funding, planning, managing and organizing public health services
throughout the country.64 Committee decisions on these regulations are made on the basis of
consensus, and these decisions also bind the representative members.65 Moreover, the Committee

60

See Alcides S. Miranda, Intergovernmental Health Policy Decisions in Brazil: Cooperation Strategies for
Political Mediation, 22 HEALTH POL’Y PLAN. 186 (2007).
61
Id. at 188.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
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may penalize municipalities or states who fail to comply with these decisions by suspending
conditional health transfers.66
In the United States, which lacks a centralized health policy system, public health services
are often shared between state and local governments. In certain states, however, that state
department of health dictates the operation of local health agencies. Six states operate centralized
public health institutions that “directly govern[ ] and operate[ ] local public health agencies.”67
Thus, in Arkansas, the State Department of Health coordinates a Center for Local Public Health,
which operates local public health units throughout the state.68
1. Law Enforcement
Few states employ traditional intergovernmental institutions that primarily govern law
enforcement. Instead, federal states rely on informal arrangements or intergovernmental
cooperation between individual law enforcement agencies that are governed by jurisdictional or
administrative guidelines, e.g. joint task forces. Some states, however, have provided for a body
that

formalizes

otherwise

loose

intergovernmental

cooperation.

Regardless

of

the

institutionalization, these bodies lack real political power over representative members. Instead,
these institutions simply aid in intergovernmental cooperation.
Interestingly, Nigeria has constitutionally mandated an intergovernmental police force to
be administered National Police Council. Pursuant to the 1999 constitution, Nigeria established
the Nigeria Police Force, which consists of Inspector-General of Police nominated by the president
following advice from the National Police Council, and a Commissioner of Police for each state

66

Id.
Eileen Salinsky, Governmental Public Health: An Overview of State and Local Public Health Agencies, NAT’L
HEALTH POL’Y FORUM, 9 (Aug. 18, 2010), https://www.nhpf.org/library/backgroundpapers/BP77_GovPublicHealth_08-18-2010.pdf.
68
About ADH, ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH (2017), https://www.healthy.arkansas.gov/about-the-arkansasdepartment-of-health.
67
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of Nigeria appointed by a separate constitutional institution, the Police Service Commission.69
Notably, the Police Force is jurisdictionally delineating pursuant to constitutional provision:
generally, the Police Force falls under the command of the Inspector-General of Police while
contingents of the Force stationed in a state are primarily under the command of the Commissioner
of Police of that state subject to any conflicting authority from the Inspector-General.70
The Police Force is administered by the Nigeria Police Council, which consists of the
federal president, who serves as chairman; the governor of each state; the chairman of the Police
Service Commission; and the Inspector-General of Police.71 The Council’s main function is the
general supervision of the Nigeria Police Force and to provide advice to the president on the
appointment of the Inspector-General of Police. The Police Force generally facilitates the
“gathering, collating and sharing of information and intelligence” relating to criminal activity and
aids in providing a uniformly trained police force.72
Switzerland’s Konferenz der Städtischen Sicherheitsdirektorinnen und -direktoren (KSSD)
is a quintessential Swiss intergovernmental institution much like the Städteverband. The KSSD is
technically an outgrowth of the Städteverband and falls within the purview of Article 60 of the
Swiss Constitution.73 Members of the KSSD are municipalities with more than 10,000 residents
and constitute the three main organs of the institution: the general body, the board, and the steering
committee.74 Similar to the Städteverband, the KSSD encourages information sharing and the
production of reports, advice, and responses to security issues facing Swiss municipalities.75

69

CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1999), § 214.
Id.
71
Id. sched. 3, § 27.
72
Vision and Mission, NIGERIA POLICE FORCE, https://www.npf.gov.ng/aboutus/vision_mission.php (last visited
Oct. 24, 2019).
73
See Bundesverfassung [BV] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, art. 60, para. 1 (Switz.).
74
Statuten der Konferenz der Städtischen Sicherheitsdirektorinnen und -Direktore, Sept. 24, 2018, art. 4 (Switz.),
https://kssd.ch/cmsfiles/statuten_kssd_d_25.05.2018_genehmigt_durch_vorstand_ssv_24.09.2018.pdf.
75
See id. art. 7–8.
70
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CONCLUSION
This Article by no means represents an exhaustive taxonomy of intergovernmental
institutions. Rather, this Article simply offers a sampling of the most prevalent and, at times,
interesting examples of intergovernmental institutions described in the available literature.76
Generally, intergovernmental institutions present meaningful opportunities for strengthening the
relative bargaining position for lower orders of governments. These institutions may also perform
significant actions concerning specific state problems, including tax distribution, public health,
and international cooperation. Intergovernmental institutions are not unequivocally beneficial,
however, to federal states. Organizations lack public participation and are often obscured from
state citizens.
Overall, most federal states employ a wide range of intergovernmental institutions, but
many states use similar institutions. Overwhelmingly, the most common form of
intergovernmental institution is executive in nature and composition, but some organizations, such
as policy-specific institutions, also exist with more specific functions and more varied personnel.
While there is broad variation in the method of operationalizing institutions, i.e. legislation rather
than an agreement, there are some generalizations that can be drawn. For example, chief minister
conferences appear to enjoy more constitutional entrenchment, while horizontal institutions, like
municipal or state conferences, are often the result of agreements among members.
Vertical institutions, representing the most collaborative version of intergovernmental
institutions, are dominated by federal actors. Structurally, this is seen in the foundation of vertical
institutions. The legal arrangements normally afford the federal actor the power to convene the
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institution and set the entire agenda while granting other members the ability to recommend for
inclusion on the agenda. This procedure is followed for India’s Interstate Council and several other
states’ chief minister conferences. Thus, even if arrangements for vertical institutions call for
unanimous or even majority decision-making, the federal member still wields significant authority
over the institution by foreclosing certain discussion or institutional action. Federal dominance is
likely a product of the federal government’s dominance in the state generally; a strong federal
government is not likely to cede even nominal authority to other state actors absent overwhelming
pressure or federal failures.
Measuring the efficacy of intergovernmental institutions is difficult due to a variety of
reasons. As Powell notes, “[t]here are no uniform indicators for measuring the impact of IGR, and
causality would be difficult to determine even if they were.”77 On an abstract level, however, the
effectiveness of institutions does not seem to depend on the status of the institution, since even
constitutionally mandated bodies often wholly serve advisory roles. In fact, policy specific
institutions seem to be the best poised bodies for generating meaningful intergovernmental
cooperation despite a lack of political authority. Outputs from intergovernmental institutions are
generally limited to advice, coordination, or reports, even though some unique institutions wield
abnormally significant abilities to formally bind members to legal action. Consequently, measuring
output efficacy across intergovernmental institutions is difficult.
Though most intergovernmental institutions serve an advisory or consultative role, such
institutions are not inherently ineffective. The lack of formal institutional action does not define
an institution’s efficacy. Oftentimes, vertical intergovernmental institutions play a significant role
in planning the implementation of national policy by providing a forum for federal actors to
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coordinate with state and local governments. These meetings can provide important consultation
and discussion between policymakers (here the federal actor) and actors who will be implementing
the policy at the ground level (state and local governments). On the other side, vertical institutions
allow lower level state actors to discuss local problems with federal actors that may ultimately lead
to more effective policy making at the federal level. In horizontal institutions, forums provide state
and local actors an opportunity to coordinate a unified front on policy issues that may facilitate
negotiations with federal actors outside the intergovernmental institution.
Intergovernmental institutions, despite providing valuable coordination opportunities, also
present difficult accountability, transparency, and bureaucratic issues. Generally, there is no true
consistency in transparency across intergovernmental institutions. Some institutions meet privately
and may not produce public work product. For instance, despite the strength of Germany’s
Ministerpräsidentskonferenzen, all institutional meetings are shielded from public observation.
Thus, such procedures can frustrate democratic accountability by shielding local, state, and federal
actors from democratic responsibility for actions and decisions within intergovernmental
institutions. If intergovernmental institutions produce outcomes that citizens deem unproductive
or negative, citizens may not have a clear understanding of which actor is responsible for which
action. Moreover, these institutions seem to rarely seek direct external input from constituencies
and do not formally include citizens as members. No surveyed institution invites public
participation during institutional meetings, and no institution mandates participation from state
citizens. Lastly, intergovernmental institutions necessarily burden the state logistically. Because
most institutions incorporate members who serve other governmental roles, service on the
intergovernmental institution naturally interferes with the other service.
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